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[04-10] 【Eco-特别报道】A la recherche du temps perdu 追忆似水年华
AMERICA AND THE WORLD
A la recherche du temps perdu
追忆似水年华
Mar 27th 2008
From The Economist print edition
Translation Lennon.W
The old certainties of the cold war have gone. What might replace them?
冷战时期旧有的基石已经荡然无存，新的秩序何在？
When the world was simpler
当时世界多简单
WHEN Bill Clinton ran for the presidency in 1992, America was giddy with the thought of the peace dividend.[1] George Bush senior may have proved his mastery of foreign affairs by ending the cold war and driving Saddam out of Kuwait, but Mr Clinton seemed young and energetic, the economy was sagging, and America wanted a holiday from 40 years of staring down the Russians.
1992年，当比尔·克林顿还在为竞选总统奔波之时，美国人已经被和平红利冲晕了头脑。老布什结束了冷战，将萨达姆赶出了科威特，这或许可以证明其非凡的外交手腕；克林顿则表现得更为年富力强。在经历了四十年与俄罗斯的针锋相对之后，又赶上经济疲软，美国人都想停下来放个假了。
This time round the mood is different. Foreign policy is central to the election, with Mrs Clinton and Mr Obama both arguing that America needs to change course in the Middle East and Mr McCain presenting himself as the only candidate with the experience and determination to keep America safe. At the same time the foreign-policy establishment is immersed in nostalgia for the cold war. It is understandably nervous about big foreign-policy ideas in the wake of the Iraq war. But in so far as there is a big idea making the rounds, it is “containment”. America should concentrate on containing Iran until it collapses under the weight of its own contradictions; containing al-Qaeda until it dies a natural death; and containing the spillover from the mess in Iraq. Today's foreign-policy mandarins cite George Kennan[2], one of the architects of the containment policy during the cold war, with the same enthusiasm as their elders did in the 1950s.
而这次大选，民情又有不同。外交政策成了大选的中心，克林顿夫人与奥巴马都声称美国应转变其在中东的政策，而麦凯恩则自称是唯一拥有足够的经验与决心保卫美国安全的候选人。美国的外交界对冷战时期充满了怀念。伊拉克战争引起了美国人民对外交政策的广泛关注。至始自终，美国的外交政策一直围绕着一个大的理念展开，那便是遏制。美国要遏制伊朗，让它在自身内部的矛盾中土崩瓦解；要遏制基地组织，直到它寿终正寝；还要遏制伊拉克混乱局势中的一系列出乎意料的变化。美国今日的外交官员们引用起乔治·柯南（冷战时期遏制政策的奠基人）来，其劲头丝毫不输给50年代他们的前辈。
There is good reason for this nostalgia. America remains the world's indispensable power. But there is far more disagreement over American foreign policy than there was in Kennan's day. Should it concentrate on the nexus between terrorism, rogue states and WMD or should it pay more attention to China and Russia? And how should it deal with terrorists? Should it continue with Mr Bush's ambitious policy of exporting America's power and values or should it settle for a more modest policy of containment?
这种怀旧情节也情有可原。美国仍然拥有世界上不可或缺的力量，然而关于美国外交政策的分歧，比起柯南的时代来有增无减。是应该致力于理清恐怖主义、流氓国家和大规模杀伤性武器之间的千头万绪，还是应该对中国与俄罗斯多点关注？如何对付恐怖主义者？是应该继承布什雄心勃勃的计划，将美国的力量与价值观扩展到全世界，还是适可而止，推行改头换面的遏制政策？
America will find it impossible to recapture the grand certainties of the post-war era. This is partly because the world has become a more fluid and complicated place. “Containment” might work in Iran, but what about Saudi Arabia or Pakistan, which occupy a shadowy world between friends and enemies? And what about al-Qaeda? Moreover, the complications are refracted through a different domestic prism. The old foreign-policy establishment that shaped the post-war world has collapsed, partisan divisions are growing and domestic lobbies are increasingly using foreign policy for local rather than national ends, making its conduct much more erratic and volatile.
美国将会发现，战后时期的那种大局在握的感觉已经一去不回了。原因之一是世界局势越来越变得居无常形，错综复杂。遏制政策对伊朗可能奏效，然而对那些介于敌友之间的国家，如沙特阿拉伯或巴基斯坦，当如何处置？拿基地组织又怎么办呢？更有甚者，这种复杂性甚至体现在美国国内的政局上。美国以往的国际策略是战后世界格局形成的基础，随着这一政策的分崩离析，美国国内党派林立之势日益明显。各党派开始利用外交政策为自身牟利，而非出于国家利益考虑。这使得局势愈发扑朔迷离，瞬息万变。
A different kind of partisanship
党派之争又谱新章
The most striking change in American foreign policy since the end of the cold war is the rise in partisanship. As Charles Kupchan, of Georgetown University, has argued, the architects of the cold war did their best to secure broad support for their formula of liberal internationalism: American power abroad embedded in multilateral institutions. Their efforts did not eliminate disagreements. The liberal establishment was challenged by populists like Joseph McCarthy. America was torn apart by Vietnam. But for the most part foreign-policy debates took place within parties rather than between them. Even during the Vietnam war the serious debate was less about the philosophy of containment than whether it should be extended from Europe to South-East Asia.
冷战结束之后，美国的外交政策中最显著的变化就是党派的影响日渐明显。如乔治郡大学的查里斯·库普坎称，冷战时代的缔造者不遗余力地为他们的国际自由主义公式网罗支持者，将美国的影响力渗透到多边国际制度中。然而他们的努力却没有消除反对的声音。以约瑟夫·麦卡锡为代表的平民主义者对自由主义的建立口诛笔伐。越战即起，美国国内不再是铁板一块。然而关于外交政策的大部分探讨都是在党派内部进行的，即使在越战期间，大家对遏制策略本身仍然没有太多疑义，争论的重点是是否应当将这一策略从欧洲扩展到东北亚。
The partisanship of the Bush era is quite different: fought between parties rather than within them and driven by deep-seated disagreements over policy. Mr Bush's decision to extend the “war on terror” from Afghanistan to Iraq destroyed the bipartisan consensus established by September 11th. And his willingness to use the war against the Democrats ended any chance of rebuilding that consensus.
布什时代的党派之争特点显著：政见上的分歧引起了冲突发生在党派之间，而非党派内部。布什将反恐战争的战火从阿富汗烧到了伊拉克，这一决断摧毁了两党之间靠着911事件达成的一致。此后布什执意用这场战争来对付民主党，这也使得两党间破镜重圆的希望不复存在。
The two parties are now more divided over foreign policy than they have been at any point since the second world war. A Pew report in 2005 concluded that “foreign-affairs assertiveness now almost completely distinguishes Republican-oriented voters from Democratic-oriented voters; this was a relatively minor factor in past typologies.” James Q. Wilson, one of America's leading social scientists, notes that, although bipartisanship may have declined in the Vietnam era, it was not until the Bush era that it utterly collapsed.
现如今，两党之间关于国际政策的分歧达到了二战以来的历史最高点。2005年的Pew report写道：“外交政策的强硬与否成了支持民主党与共和党的选民的分水岭，在从前的分类中，这个并不是什么重要依据。”美国社会科学界的泰斗詹姆斯·Ｑ·威尔逊表示，虽然两党之间的分歧在越战期间就已存在，但直到布什时代，两党才彻底决裂。
This collapse makes it harder to gather popular support for America's policy. In an address to the United States Congress in 2003, Tony Blair, then Britain's prime minister, summoned up the image of the average American—“out in Nevada or Idaho or these places I've never been to, but always wanted to go”—asking why he had to shoulder the burden of America's global role. That question is even harder to answer when the country's politicians are constantly at each other's throats.
这一决裂也使得美国的政策无法再得到全民的广泛支持。2003年，当时的英国首相托尼·布莱尔在美国国会发表演说。他向普通的美国民众发出呼吁，“无论你是来自内华达，还是爱达荷，或是其他我一直想去却未曾有幸造访的地方”，希望他们思考，在国际事务中，美国为何要背负如此重要的角色。而现如今，这个国家的政治家们正忙着彼此掐斗，要回答这个问题恐怕是难上加难。
It also makes it harder to provide continuity. Successful policy demands consistency and perseverance, as the cold war demonstrated. If polarised politicians and contradictory domestic interests all chip in, the result is likely to be confusion.
在这种局面下，外交政策的连续性也无法得以保证。冷战证明，成功的外交政策需要长期坚持不懈的努力与维护。若是国内所有勾心斗角的政治家和利益集团都来七嘴八舌一通，结果必然是一片混乱。
The growing power of domestic lobbies also works against continuity. Ethnic groups such as Irish-Americans have long had an influence on policy by dint of sheer numbers. But these domestic interest groups are becoming more varied and powerful as politicians are getting ever hungrier for cash. Henry Kissinger once noted that “what is presented by foreign critics as America's overweening quest for domination is very frequently a response to domestic pressure groups.” This tendency is likely to increase in the post-Bush era, leading to a still more fragmented foreign policy.
国内各种团体的壮大也给外交政策的持续性添了不少乱。像美籍爱尔兰人这样的群体，长期以来一直籍着人多势众对政策施加着影响。只是现在，随着政客们对金钱的渴求，这些利益集团的越来越多，其势力也越来越大。亨利·基辛格曾说过，“国际上总有关于美国自负号令天下的批评，然而美国这些表现十有八九是出于国内某些利益集团的压力”。在后布什时代，这种趋势仍将继续下去，外交政策也会因此变得更加支离破碎。
The power of pressure groups is magnified by the indifference of large numbers of Americans to foreign affairs. America has always had a big country's introspective tendencies, which are now being reinforced by the fragmentation of the media. The established broadcasting networks have cut back on their foreign coverage, and the cable networks' talkshows pander to their audiences' prejudices.
很大一部分美国大众中对外交政策漠不关心，这也助长了那些集团的势力。做为一个大国，美国一向有自我审视的传统，现今媒体的多元化无疑也使这种传统得以发扬。已有的广播网络已经削减了他们海外市场的覆盖范围，有线电视的谈话节目更是为迎合观众的成见精心打造的。
American exceptionalism adds to the complexities of foreign policy. Americans are more religious, more patriotic and more willing to use force in global affairs than the citizens of other advanced countries. When it comes to religiosity, Americans are more like the inhabitants of developing countries than of other developed countries; when it comes to the use of force, Americans continue to inhabit the 19th-century world of great-power politics whereas Europeans believe in diplomacy and treaties.
“美国例外论”也给他们的外交政策添了不少麻烦。与其他发达国家的人民相比，美国人身上的理想主义与爱国主义气息更为浓烈，在国际事务中更为倾向于使用武力。头脑发热起来，美国人比其他发达国家更像是发展中国家居民；而在欧洲国家已经认可通过外交手段和条约解决国际问题的今天，美国的思维仍然停留在19世界强权政治横行的时代。
American exceptionalism may not be as big a problem for the next administration as it has been for the present one. The Iraq war has left America exhausted, and the Democrats are closer in their outlook to the Europeans than are the Republicans. But Mr Bush's Republican combination of national assertiveness and idealism has deep roots in American history, and the balance of power in America continues to shift from the more “European” north-east to the South and the sunbelt. In the longer term exceptionalism is likely to re-emerge.
对美国的下一任总政府来说，美国例外论的影响或许不像现在这么大。伊拉克战争已经让美国人精疲力竭，民主党人与欧洲国家的关系貌似比共和党略为亲近一些。然而布什在位期间，共和党将美国人的民族自觉与深植于美国历史中的理想主义熔于一炉。再加上美国境内的力量平衡也开始从较为“欧化”的东北向南方地区和“阳光地带”移动，长久看来，例外论恐怕还会再次抬头。
Demographic trends will encourage its return. America's fertility rate is 60% higher than Japan's and 40% higher than the European average. America is taking in immigrants at a faster rate than Europe and making a better job of assimilating them. The UN Population Division predicts that by 2025 America's population will be growing by about 2.5m a year whereas Europe's will be shrinking; that the median age in America will be lower than in Europe (38 compared with 44); and that a smaller proportion of the population will be over 65 (18% compared with 21%).
人口统计上的走向也对例外论的复苏有利。美国的生育率比日本高出60%，比欧洲的平均水平高出40%。美国的移民增长速度也远较欧洲为快，在对移民的同化工作上他们也更胜一筹。联合国人口部门预测，到2025年，美国人口将以每年250万的速度增长，而欧洲人口则仍然会持续收缩；美国人的平均年龄是38岁，比欧洲的44岁低；65岁以上的人口比例，美国是18%，欧洲则是21%。
Kid power儿童的力量
America will be the only big developed country where children outnumber pensioners, and one of the few developed countries where the working-age population is still growing. Europe will struggle with financing its welfare state and absorbing immigrants, whereas America will remain relatively young and vigorous.
在大型发达国家中，美国是唯一一个儿童比老人数量大的，也是少数几个工作年龄的人口还在增长的发达国家之一。相对而言，美国还比较年轻，比较有活力，欧洲国家已经为社会福利与移民问题叫苦不迭了。
Try something new
全新的尝试
The problems with American foreign policy under the next president are likely to be very different from those under the current one: it will suffer from a lack of certainty rather than an excess of it. A Democratic administration is likely to be similar to the first Clinton administration in 1993-97: risk-averse and hypersensitive to domestic pressure, responsive rather than history-making, opportunistic rather than principled. Even a McCain administration will find itself hemmed in by Democratic majorities in Congress and war-weariness among the public. This could also produce a muddled foreign policy, with the president pulling in one direction and Congress in the other.
美国的下一任总统在任期内会遇到的外交问题或许与目前这任迥然不同。小布什过于胸有成竹，而下一任总统恐怕要小心翼翼得多。如果民主党当选，情况或许会类似93-97年克林顿的第一次执政：国内压力重重，四面楚歌，只能见招拆招，无暇去创造历史，需要放弃一些原则性立场去见机行事。即便麦凯恩上台，也会陷入国会中占大多数的民主党人的包围中，还要面对广大民众的厌战情绪。国会与总统南辕北辙的结果，会使美国在外交政策上陷入混乱。
The short-term prospect for America's foreign policy is one of confusion. The country will remain uncertain about its role in the world, unable to extricate itself from Iraq, unwilling to devote enough resources to dealing with Islamic terrorism and buffeted by partisan divisions at home. Yet the longer-term prospects are no more edifying. America is deeply divided between a Democratic Party that wrings its hands over American exceptionalism and a Republican Party that rejoices in it. Hyperpower and hyper-partisanship are an explosive combination. The world will have to learn to live with it.
美国外交政策的短期前景一片混乱。美国对自己在国际社会上所处的地球还不是那么明确，伊拉克的局面也使她无法脱身。一方面不愿投入足够的资源来和穆斯林恐怖主义分子讲和，另一方面国内的党派之争愈演愈烈。长期来讲，情况也好不到哪里去。在对待例外论上，民主党束手无策，而共和党则忙不迭地与之握手言欢，两党渐行渐远。党派对立严重的局面加上美国所拥有的超级力量，整个世界都需要面对这种危如累卵的形势。
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