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[03-11] [Economist-亚非拉]The puzzle of power 权力之迷思
Japan's regions日本地方
The puzzle of power 权力之迷思
Mar 6th 2008 | KUMAMOTO
From The Economist print edition
Japan's local governments are unhealthily dependent on its national one 日本地方政府反常地依赖中央政府
THE overarching puzzle ofJapanese politics over the past half-century is why democracy has notproduced a competitive system in which political parties alternate inpower. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which is little loved, hasbeen in power for all but ten months since its formation in 1955, withhelp from a shifting cast of junior allies. Last summer the oppositionDemocratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won unprecedented control of the upperhouse of the Diet (parliament). But the LDP and its coalition partner,New Komeito, still control an overwhelming two-thirds of the lowerhouse and, though the opposition is frustrating efforts by the LDP topass a budget—hoping to precipitate a general election—its leadersadmit in private that they do not expect to break the rulingcoalition's majority, at least not yet.
过去半个世纪里日本政坛的一个主要的迷思就是为何民主没有产生一个政党轮流执政的竞争性的系统。不怎么受到钟爱自民党自从1955年建党起，除了10个月外，借助于下级同盟的一套变通的阵容一直掌权。去年夏天，反对党日本民主党赢得空前的胜利，控制了国会参议院。但自民党和它的联合对象公明党在众议院里仍控制着2/3的压倒性优势，而且，尽管反对党为了促成大选提前，挫败了自民党通过预算的努力，反对党党魁也私下承认他们不期望能够打破掌权的联合多数，至少现在没有。
For one answer to the puzzle, look at therelationship between the centre and the regions. Japan has a rich arrayof local governments: there are 1,800-odd municipal governments and 47prefectural ones. Yet more than any big rich democracy, Japanconcentrates political power and financial resources at the centre.Masayasu Kitagawa, a modernising former governor of Mie prefecture,reckons that four-fifths of spending at the prefectural level andtwo-fifths at the municipal level is mandated by central government.
为了得到这个迷思的一个答案，看看中央和地方的关系。日本的地方政府不胜枚举：1800多个市政府和47个县政府。然而日本比任何大的发达民主体都更多地将政治权力和财政资源集中于中央。三重县1995年前县知事北川正恭估算，县一级开销的4/5和市一级的2/5由中央政府托管。
That breeds an unhealthy client-patrondependency at every level. In local elections, politicians need tobring home the pork if they are to keep local supporters happy. Thismeans pleasing farmers who depend on subsidies and construction androad-building companies who benefit from infrastructure contracts. Inturn, LDP barons—and the powerful bureaucrats who are their allies—relyon local politicians to deliver the votes in national elections. Porkis their reward. This gives the incumbent party a huge advantage, butit also ensures that the LDP remains a party of patronage more than ofpolicy.
这在每一级都滋生了一种不健康的“客户-赞助人”的依赖关系。在地方选举中，政客需要带回“猪肉”以博取地方支持者的欢心。这意味着取悦依靠津贴的农民和从基建合同中获益的建筑与修路公司。反之，自民党权贵和同盟的强权官僚依赖于地方政客在国家选举中输送选票。“猪肉”就是他们的奖赏。这给予当权政党极大的优势，但也使自民党成为一个赞助的党，而不是政策的党。
In such a system, says Mr Kitagawa, localgovernments act as mere contractors to the centre. It is the chiefcause of the wasteful infrastructure spending that blights Japan'slandscape. In Kumamoto, for example, a struggling prefecture onsouthern Kyushu island, one local official admits that unnecessary newbypasses, financed partly by the central government, are hastening thedecline of town centres, which get little government investment.Meanwhile, he says, a planned costly extension of the bullet train, onwhich the prefecture pins its hopes, is just as likely to make iteasier for businesses and young people to flee to the thriving big cityof Fukuoka as it is to attract them.
在这样的一个系统中，北川先生说，地方政府仅不过充当中央的承包商。这正是挥霍的基建开销摧残了日本风景的一个主要原因。比如在熊本，南方的九州岛上的一个苦苦挣扎的县，一位当地的官员承认由中央财政提供部分支持的毫无建设必要的新旁道，加速了仅能得到很少政府投资的城镇中心的衰落。同时，他说，计划中的对高速火车的昂贵扩充背负着该县的希望，但也可能使得经济活动和年轻人更容易的逃到吸引他们的福岡县繁荣的大城市里。
The LDP has tried to improve things. JunichiroKoizumi, the reformist prime minister between 2001 and 2006, slashedpublic spending on infrastructure, which at its peak was three or fourtimes higher than in other rich countries. But it remains high. He alsointroduced measures that were supposed radically to decentralise power.Yet, apart from saving the central government money, they have notworked. Although Tokyo claimed it was giving localities greaterautonomy, in practice it slashed subsidies, leaving local governmentstottering under a weight of debt incurred as a result of projectsordered by the national government years before.
自民党已经开始试着改善。2001年至2006年的改革派首相小泉純一郎，大幅缩减了在基建上的公共支出——这项支出的最高时曾是其它发达国家的三或四倍。但仍是很高。他也引入了度量标准，被认为是要根本地分散权力。然而，除了节约中央政府的钱，他们没有起作用。尽管东京声明这给予了地方更大的自治权，这实际上大幅缩减了补助金，留下地方政府在多年以前国家政府下令的工程所招来的大量债务下蹒跚而行。
Onecautionary tale still haunts debt-laden local governments: the fate ofYubari, a former mining town in Hokkaido. When its mining industrycollapsed, Yubari sought to reinvent itself as a tourist spot, buildinga theme-park in an old mine, starting an international film festivaland promoting ludicrously expensive Yubari melons (one pair sold for¥2m, or $19,000). But all the promotion cost money. In 2005 Yubari wentbust with debts worth 14 times annual tax revenues. Their precariousfinancial position leaves localities more dependent, not less, on thegoodies Tokyo is minded to hand out, reinforcing patronage in manyplaces.
一个反面教材仍萦绕在负债的地方政府的心头：夕張市的命运——北海道的曾经的一个矿业城市。当它的矿业崩溃时，夕张市寻求将自己彻底改造成一个观光地，建设了一个旧式煤矿的主题公园，开设了一个国际电影节并滑稽地推广着昂贵的夕张瓜（一对卖到了2百万日元，或19000美元）。但一切都需要钱。在2005年，夕张市陷入财务危机，负债相当于年税收的14倍。它们危险的财务状况使当地政府进一步依赖于而非脱离东京有意分发的糖果，在很多地方稳固了赞助人的地位。
But not everywhere. Many city-dwellers, inparticular, resent their taxes going towards special interests. Theyfavour policies that promote market reforms and consumer interests. TheDPJ has drawn most of its support from this base, as did Mr Koizumi.Indeed, the party's leader, Ichiro Ozawa, has picked as his budgetfight this month one of Mr Koizumi' s pet hates: a “temporary” levy of¥24, raised for over 30 years on every litre of petrol and given overto road-building and maintenance, feeding a huge road-building lobby.
但并非是每一个地方。许多居民尤其愤恨他们的税金流向特殊利益。他们钟爱促进市场改革和保护消费者利益的政策。如同小泉先生一样，DPJ依靠这个基础争取到了它的大多数支持者。的确，这个月，DPJ党魁小沢一郎将他的预算战斗选定为小泉先生最厌恶的：三十多年来对每公升汽油征收24日元的一项“临时”税，这份税款移交给修路公司与维护者，维持着一个庞大的修路游说团体。
Typically of Japanese politics, Mr Ozawa's fightis not based on principle. The DPJ's manifesto for the upper-houseelections bore no mention of the levy. Meanwhile Mr Ozawa is promisingrural voters even more goodies than the LDP—which is perhaps why itdoes not emphasise decentralisation more.
作为典型的日本政客，小泽的战斗并不基于原则。DPJ的上议院选举宣言只字不提这项税收。同时，小泽向地方投票人允诺了比LDP更多的糖果——也许是因为它不重视权力分散。
A new broom
下车伊始
Frustration is gathering among reformers in bothmain parties, and has found expression in a new cross-party pressuregroup that includes over 100 Diet politicians and many local reformers,such as Mr Kitagawa. It had its first get-together on March 3rd. CalledSentaku (an untranslatable word which basically means bothchoice and washing things clean), it wants to decentralise, limit thepower of the central bureaucracy and—a novel thought—encourage partiesto compete in elections on the basis of articulate manifestos.
挫败在两个主要党团中都聚集了改革派，他们在一个新建的跨党的压力团体中找到了自己的表达方式，这个团体包括超过100位议员和许多地方改革派，如北川。他们在3月3日召开第一次聚会。称为“選択”（一个不易翻译的单词，主要表示选择和洗清的意思），他们希望分权，限制中央官僚机构的权利，并且——一个新奇的想法——鼓励政党基于的清晰的宣言在选举中竞争。
To some commentators, Sentaku promisessalvation at a time when Japan's politics is in a deep despond.Perhaps. But if its members cannot effect change from within their ownparties, how will they be able to do it from outside?
对于时事评论家，一旦日本政坛陷入沮丧，“選択”给人以拯救的希望。或许会吧。但如果它的成员不能促成党内改革，又怎能“攘党外”呢？
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